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I have read with the greatest pleasure the article on federal white-collar
crime sentencing by U.S. District Judge Mark Bennett and Professors Justin
Levinson and Koichi Hioki.' They review the history of fraud sentencing in
the Sentencing Guidelines era, offer a persuasive critique of some deficiencies

in the current regime, present the results of their own survey of judicial
attitudes toward sentencing a representative fraud case, and propose a series
of useful prescriptions for change. Inasmuch as they are kind enough to cite
my own work approvingly throughout the article, it will come as no surprise
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that I agree with most of their diagnoses and virtually all of their prescriptions.
That said, there are a few points on which we are not entirely in accord, and
I think that the data from their very interesting survey may point in slightly
different directions than they suggest. Hence, I offer this admiring rejoinder.
I.

POINTS OF AGREEMENT

Let me begin by noting the points on which I agree with Judge Bennett
and his colleagues (who, for the sake of brevity and with no intent to stint on
my admiration of Professors Levinson and Hioki, I will customarily refer to
simply as "Judge Bennett").
Judge

Bennett

is

correct

that

the

Federal

Sentencing

Guidelines

("Guidelines") promulgated in 1987 consciously altered the previous paradigm
for white-collar sentencing by prescribing short, but definite, terms of
incarceration for economic criminals who would, under the prior regime of total
judicial discretion, almost invariably have received probation.' He is also correct
that, over the next decade and a half, the combination of a scattershot accretion
of annual amendments, the 2001 Economic Crime Package restructuring of the
economic crime guidelines,; and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2oo21 and
responsive guideline amendments pushed the fraud sentences called for by the
Guidelines to unprecedented levels of severity, particularly for crimes involving
large pecuniary losses.5,
Of course, the fact that something is unprecedented does not necessarily
make it bad. In my view, the transformative insight of the 1987 Guidelinesthat economic crime is as morally blameworthy and socially harmful as crimes
of other sorts, and thus calls for meaningful incarcerative punishment-was
entirely correct. Moreover, at least some of the post-1987 increases in
guideline sentences for economic crime were justified, or at the least not
manifestly unreasonable. As I will discuss below, there is solid evidence that
until roughly 2001-2003 the federal judiciary was in broad agreement with
this assessment! The problem is that the continual upward ratchet of
economic crime sentencing levels got out of hand. Accordingly, I fully concur

2.
Id. at 948-49; see also Frank 0. Bowman, III, Pour Encourager les Autres? The Cuous
llistoty and I)istressingImplicationsofthe CriminalProvisionsof the Satbanes-OxleyAct and the Sentencing
(;uidtlines Amendments that Followed, i 01no Sim. J. CRIM. L. 373,385 (2004).
3. See generallyFrank 0. Bowman, III, The 2oo FederalEonomic Crime SeiteningReforms: An
Analysis and Legislative llistoly, 35 IND. L. REv. 5 (2001) (describing and analyzing the 2001
Economic Crime Package restructuring of the federal economic crime sentencing guidelines).
4. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 1i6 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 U.S.C.).
5. Bennett et al., sufra note i, at 951-514; see Bowman, suprna note 2, at 387-89, 405-o6;
see also Frank 0. Bowman III, Sentencing High-Loss Corporate Insider Frauds After Booker, 2o FED.
SENI'C, REP. 167, t68 (2008).
6. See inita notes 33-51 and the accompanying text.
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with Judge Bennett that there is a subset of economic-crime defendants for
whom the current Guidelines prescribe sentences that incontestably exceed
the bounds of reason.7 The trickier question is correctly identifying that
subset.
There is nearly universal agreement that the fraud guideline, section
2B1.1, now prescribes unreasonable sentences for many high-loss
defendantsS There is also a body of opinion, centered principally in the
defense bar, but including some federaljudges and academic commentators,
which holds that section 2B 1.1 is pitched too high even for many defendants
who inflicted losses in the middle ranges of the fraud-loss table.! Judge
Bennett seems to be in this camp.- And even among those who think the
primary problem is with high-loss defendants, there is considerable
divergence of opinion over where, which is to say at what amount of loss, the
troublesome high-loss category begins. Reading the work of Judge Bennett
and his colleagues has provided me with food for thought on this point and
stimulated some new reflections that I share below.I also heartily agree withJudge Bennett's assessment that the Sentencing
Commission's 2015 amendments to the fraud guideline were wholly
inadequate to address its deficiencies, and I have enumerated my
2
disappointments with those amendments in testimony to the Commission1

7. Compare Bennett et at., supra note i, at 973 (referring to "long-known shortcomings of
the [economic-crime provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines], especially as they relate to the
exceedingly harsh punishments of high-value economic criminals"), with Frank 0. Bowman, III,
Damp Squib: The DisappointinffgDenouementof the Sentemcing Commission"s Economic Clme Projet (and
What Tho , Should Do Now), 27 FED. SENI' RiEP. 270, 270 (2015) (contending "that for high-loss
defendants the fraud guideline is... 'fundamentally broken"' (quoting Patti B. Saris, Chair, U.S.
Sentencing Comm'n, Remarks for Public Meeting 2 (Jan. 9, 2015), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/
default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-and-meetings/20150109/Remarks.pdf)).
8.
See Bennett et al., suna note i, at 973-74; Bowman, supra note 7, at 270 (noting the
widespread dissatisfaction with section 2Bi.i in high-loss cases and the concession by U.S.
Sentencing Commission Chair Patti B. Saris that the guideline does not appear to work for cases
where the loss exceeds one million dollars).
9. See, e.g,James E. Felman, Chairman, Am. Bar Ass'n Criminal Justice Section, Testimony on
Behalf of the American Bar Association Before the United States Sentencing Commission for the
Hearing on Proposed Amendments to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Regarding Economic Crimes
9 (Mar. 12, 201 5), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearingsand-meetings/2015031 s'/Felman.pdf (urging the Commission to "address the overstated impact of loss
on the guidelines at all points in the loss table").
o. See Bennett et al., supranote i, at 973-75.
I].
See in/ta notes 69-8o and the accompanying text.
12.
See geoinally FRANK 0. BOWvMAN, III, COMMENT ON PROPOSED AMENIDMENTS TO E(cONOMI
CRIME GUiD1)1INI §2B1.1
(2015),
http://,Awv.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendmentprocess/ public-hearings-and-meetings/ 20150312 /Bowman.pdf;
U.S. SINT'G COMM'N, PUBIC
HEARING ON PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL SENTEN(ING. GIIDELINES 172-82, 189-93, 19798, 200-02 (2015), http://Av.ussc.gov/sites/defadt/files/transcipt_ 3 .pdf (comments of Frank

0. Bowman, 111).
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and in subsequent scholarship.1, Moreover, I concur in principle, and
sometimes in detail, with four of Judge Bennett's five suggestions for
improving section 2B1.1 (and indeed have made the same or similar
proposals in the past myself). In particular, I agree that the loss table should
be reworked ("trimmed" or even given a "buzz-cut" as Judge Bennett puts
it),14 the number of specific offense characteristics in section 2B 1.1 should be
reduced,"i the victim table should be revised,', and the sophisticated means
enhancement should be eliminated."7 1 will offer a few brief comments on the
details of each of these proposals below, and explain why I am unenthusiastic
about Judge Bennett's fifth suggestion-to add a downward departure for
lack of pecuniary gain.' 8
II.

WHEN DID THE FRAUD GUIDELINE JUMP THE SHARK?

As noted above, there exists a near-universal consensus that the current
iteration of section 2B1.1 prescribes insupportably severe sentences for a
subset of high-end defendants. This was not always true. Even though the
1987 Guidelines governing economic offenses embodied a paradigm shift in
routinely prescribing prison for significant white-collar defendants and the
sentences prescribed edged steadily upwards throughout the 199os, the
principal complaints about the Guidelines were: (1) the two guidelines that
then covered economic crime-section 2F1.1 for fraud and section 2B1.1 for
theft-were duplicative and confusing;'9) (2) the definition of "loss," the
measurement central to both the theft and fraud guideline, was poorly
conceived and often hard to apply;-0 (3) the Guidelines prescribed sentences
that were too long for some low-level offenders;1 and (4) the Guidelines
prescribed sentences that were too short for some serious offenders.,,
Accordingly, when the Sentencing Commission launched its six-year-long
project to revise the economic crime guidelines, the project proceeded on
two parallel tracks. One part focused on the consolidation of sections 2B 1.1
and 2F1.1 into a unitary economic crime guideline and on the redefinition
of "loss."2' The second part focused on measures, primarily adjustments to
the loss table, section 2B1.1(b)(1), that sought to make more low-loss

13.

Bowman, supra note 7, at 276.

14.

Bennett et al., supra note i, at 982-84.

15.
16.
17.

See id. at 985-86.
Id. at986-87.
Id at 988.

18.

Id,

19.

Bowman, supra note 3, at 23- 25.

20.

Id. at

21.
22.

Id. at2 9-30.
Id.

23.

Bowman, supra note i, at 387.

25-29.
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defendants eligible for non-incarcerative punishments while at the same time
increasing prison sentences for high-loss defendants.4 The result was the socalled Economic Crime Package of 2OOl, which consolidated and
restructured sections 2B1.1 and 2F1.1 into current section 2B1.1, redefined
"loss," lowered sentences for some low-loss defendants, and raised sentences
for some mid-to-high-loss defendants.' ,
As an active participant throughout the process that produced the 2OO
Economic Crime Package, 26 my assessment is that consolidation made sense
and the redefinition of "loss" was fundamentally sound and has largely stood
the test of time.?7 However, we failed to account properly for the interaction
of the enhanced 2001 loss table with the many aggravating specific offense
characteristics retained in the consolidated economic crime guideline. -s As a
result, sentences prescribed by consolidated section 2B 1.1 were pitched too
high for some segment of the high-loss offender population.29-This deficiency
was compounded by the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2oo2 and a
series of guidelines amendments enacted in response to it, with results widely
disparaged today..o
I have told this story at length elsewhere.,.' I repeat it here in abbreviated
form only because, if one goal of current reform efforts is to recalibrate fraud
sentences to levels broadly acceptable by the judiciary, it would be useful to

24.

Id. at 387-88.

25.
See generally Bowman, supra note 3 (describing and analyzing the 2001 Economic
Crime Package).
26.
See generally, e.g., Bowman, supra note 3; Frank 0. Bowman, III, A fudiions Solution: The
CriminalLaw Committee Draft Redefinition of the "Loss" Concept in Economic Crime Sentecing, 9 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 451 (2000) (describing and explaining the work of the Sentencing Guidelines
Subcommittee of the Criminal Law Committee of the FederalJudicial Conference, to which I was
the academic advisor, on the 2oo1 Economic Crime Package); Frank 0. Bowman, III, Back to
Basics: Helping the Commission Solve the "Loss"Aless With ON kamiliarTools, l o FED.SENT'G REP. 1 15

(1997) (outlining a proposed redefinition of "loss" that emphasizes the foreseeability of
pecuniary harm caused by the defendant); Frank 0. Bowman, III, Coping With "Loss": A ReExamination ofSentencingkederal Economic Climes I nde" the Guidelines, 51 VAND. L. REV. 461 (1998)

(setting out and explaining the provisions of a proposed consolidated economic crime
guideline).
27.

See generally Frank 0. Bowman, III, "Loss" Revisited: A Garded I)efense of the Centopiece of
2017) (discussing
critiques of the definition of loss adopted as part of 2o 1 Economic Crime Package and
concluding that it remains fundamentally sound, even though some technical improvements

lederal Economic Crme Sentencing (hjideine, 82 Mo. L. REv. (forthcoming

might be possible).
28.

See BOW\MAN, supra,note 12, at 5-6 (making this point).

29.

Id.

3o. See, e.g.,
Felman, supca note 9; Michael Caruso, Fed. Pub. Def., S. Dist. Fla.,
Statement Before
the United States Sentencing Commission Public Hearing on Economic Crime and Inflationary
Adjustments 1-5 (Mar. 12, 24015), http://wvww.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendmentprocess/ public-hearings-and-meetings/ 20 15o312 /Caruso.pdf.
31.

See generally Bowman, supra note 24.
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identify a period during which judges generally found them to be so. If such
a period existed, it would also be useful to know when, and if possible why,
judges became discontented. While researching these remarks, I came across
some data that, in combination with data emphasized by Judge Bennett,
provides at least hints of answers to these questions.
Consider the following charts. The first is copied from Judge Bennett's
article.:? 2 The second was recreated from a figure that was originally illustrated
in a 2oo6 U.S. Sentencing Commission report.3-3
Figure 1. Average Sentence Length and Average Guideline Minimum
for Section 2Bl.1 Offenders (2003-2012)
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32.
Bennett et al., supra note i, at 96o fig.2.
33.
U.S. SINITINCIN,
CO(MM'N,
FINAL QUARIERLY DAIA RIPORI
32 fig.D
(2oo6),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/
quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC 2oo6 Quarter Report Final.pdf ("Figure includes only cases
with a primary sentencing guideline of USSG § 2B 1.1. Additionally, cases with an amendment year
prior to 2001 were excluded from this figure because prior to this time fraud cases were reported
separately as USSG § 2F1.I. Cases with guideline minimums of life or probation were included in
the guideline minimum average computations as 470 months and zero months, respectively. In
turn, cases with sentences of 470 months or greater (including life) or probation were included in
the sentence average computations as 470 months and zero months, respectively. In addition, the
information presented in this table includes time of confinement as defined in USSG § 5C1.1.
Guideline minimums account for applicable statutoy mandatory penalties.").
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Figure 2. Average Sentence Length and Average Guideline Minimum
Quarterly Data for Section 2B1.1 Offenders (Fiscal Years 200-2oo6)
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These charts plot the difference between the average sentence actually
imposed by judges on defendants sentenced under section 2B1.1 and the
average guideline minimum sentence calculated for such defendants. Both
charts reveal an interesting fact about federal economic crime cases over the
past decade: namely, that the severity of federal fraud cases as measured by
the Guidelines (and thus in significant measure by loss amount4) has steadily
increased. ButJudge Bennett focuses on a different point: beginning in 2004,
judges, on average, sentenced defendants below the bottom of the average
guideline minimum and the divergence between the sentence imposed and
the average guideline minimum has continued to increase.3, He and his
colleagues intimate that this growing gap is evidence of an increasing judicial

34.

Research by the Sentencing Commission's staff has confirmed that the average amount of loss

in fraud cases has indeed increased over the past few years. CompareU.S. SENTENCINGCOMM'N, OVERVIEW
OFF)ERAL CRIMINAL CASES: FISCAL YEAR 201 5 , at i1 (2o16),http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files
/pdf/research-and-publications/researcl-publications/201I 6/FYI 5 Oven iew Federal Cviminal Cases
.pdf (reporting a median loss amount of $1423, 8 3,f), with U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, OVERVIEW OF
F DIERAL CRIMINAL CASES: FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 12 (2014), http://wAvw.ussc.gov/sites

/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-publications/2o14/FYi
deral
_CriminalCases.pdf (reporting a median loss amount of $195,649).
35. Bennett et al., supra note , at 960.

3

Oveiiew Fe
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unwillingness to impose the sentences prescribed by section 2B 1.1, at least in
some significant fraction of cases, even as the severity of cases as measured by
loss has edged steadily upward>'
This is a fair reading of the data, at least for the last few years. But Figure
2, which extends the trend lines back before 2003 suggests a more nuanced
story. In short, Figure 2 and other data suggest that, in FY 2002,judges were

generally content with the guideline sentences for economic offenses and
indeed gave signs of feeling that guideline economic crime sentences were
too low in some fraction of cases.:7 But FY

2002

represents a key inflection

point because, although it was the statistical year during which the Economic
Crime Package became legally effective, due to ex post facto considerations the
sentencing-enhancing features of the Package would not begin to manifest
themselves statistically for some period thereafter.. s8 The data further suggests
that, as the enhanced guideline sentencing levels for medium-to-high-loss
offenders dictated by the 2001 Economic Crime Package and the 2oo3 postSarbanes-Oxley amendments began to kick in, judges grew less content and
manifested their unease in increasingly high rates of below-guideline
sentences, a trend that accelerated after Booker rendered the Guidelines
advisory.39
To understand the data bearing on this issue requires a little background.
To begin, both before and after Booker, a significant fraction of cases in every
offense type have been sentenced below the guideline range due to a formal

36.

37.

Id. at972.

Catharine Goodwin, Thw Case for a New Loss Table, 13 FED. SENT'(; REP. 7, 8-9 (2ooo)
(describing the joint effort of the Justice Department and the Criminal Law Committee of the
Federal Judicial Conference to increase sentences for some classes of economic offenders); Letter
from Sim Lake, U.S. Dist. Judge, Chair, Sentencing Guidelines Subcomm., Criminal Law Comm.,
U.S. Judicial Conference, to Diana E. Murphy, U.S. Dist. Judge, Chairman, U.S. Sentencing
Comm'n (March 5, 2oo), in 13 F). SiNI'C RIP. 21 (2000) (expressing support for revision of
loss table that would raise sentences for many economic offenders). I can attest to the influence
of the judges on this point from personal experience during the six-year-long process that
produced the 2oo Economic Crime Package, experience that included serving as academic
advisor to the Sentencing Subcommittee of the Criminal Law Committee of the Federal Judicial
Conference.
38. The Guidelines rules in effect at the time of sentencing govern, except in the case of
rules enacted after the date on which an offense was committed that would have the effect of
increasing the guideline sentence. U.S. SENTENCIN(G GiUIDELINES MANIUAL § lB i. 11 (b) (i) (U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N 2016). In such a case, the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution bars
retroactive application of the sentencing-enhancing rule. U.S. CONSI. art. I, §§ 9-1o. In
consequence, only cases involving crimes committed on or after November 1, 2001 would
unequivocally be subject to the new rules. Cases in which the crime occurred prior to November
t, 2oo would not be subject to the new rules if they would increase the guideline sentence. Given
the time lag in investigating and prosecuting economic offenses to the sentencing stage, the effect
of the 2001 rules would have phased in slowly over a period of years. The same is true of the 2)o3
post-Saibanes-Oxley amendments.
39. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 2420, 245 (2005).
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"departure" or, after Booker, a "variance."4o For example, in 2002, judges
sentenced 34.2% of all defendants below the applicable range, a figure that
increased to 50.5% by 2015.4, As for defendants sentenced within range,
judges have imposed sentences at the bottom of the applicable range or in its
lower half in the overwhelming majority of cases, regardless of offense type.
For example, in 2002, 74.6% of all defendants sentenced within-range were
either sentenced to the guideline minimum (59.8%) or within the lower half
of the range (14.8%).42 In 2015, the percentage was 71.2%.13 The
combination of below-range sentences in a third or more of all cases and the
overwhelming prevalence of bottom-of-the-range sentences for the remainder

40.
Prior to Booke, the only mechanism available to a judge who wished to impose a
sentence outside of (i.e., either above or below) the calculated guideline range was a
"departure," which the judge was obliged to explain in terms of factors like the presence of
substantial assistance to the goveinment, § 5Ki.i, or the presence of aggravating or mitigating
factors of a type or degree not accounted for by the Guidelines themselves, § 5 K4.o. The
Guidelines had, and continue to have, a great many rules restricting or discouraging departures.
See generally U.S. SiNIl NCING GUII[)1IN[IS MANUAL §§ 5Ki.1-5K 3 .i (U.S. SiN Il NCING CONININ
2004). And prior to Booketm appellate courts had both the power and, fr'equently, the disposition
to vacate departures they thought inappropriate. See, e.g., Frank 0. Bowman, III & Michael Heise,
(IitietRbellion? Exp)lainingNeaily a Decade of IcliningFede1Dug Settemtes, 86 I()A L. RiEV. 1043,
11 14-16 (2001 ) (discussing the effect of Koon v. huiiled States,
518 U.S. 81 (1996), on appellate

review of district court departures). After Bookel,the departure mechanisms remained in place,
but are substantially devalued inasmuch as there are now virtually no meaningful restrictions on
sentencingjudges' power to vary fiom the guideline range.
41.
CoUNat U.S. SENTEN( NGCOMM'N, 2002 SOURCEBOOKOF FEDERAL SENTEN(CING STATISTI(CS
tbl.26 (2003), http://,v.ussc.go/research/2o15-sourcebook/archixe/sourcebook-2oo2
(reporting 10,203 cases of "substantial assistance departure" and 9,865 cases of "other downward
departure" out of 58,684 total cases) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMhM'N, 2002 SO(
EBOOK],
with U.S. SENi ENCING COMM'N, 2015 SOURCiHOOK OF FEDERAI SiNi ENCING SIATI SiICS tbl.26
53

(2016), http://wAw.ussc.gov/research/sourcebook-2o1 5 (reporting 8,470 cases of "§ 5 Ki.i
substantial assistance," 6,s94 cases of "§5 K3 . i early disposition," 5,S24 cases that were "other
gov[ernmen] t sponsored," 1,521 cases of "downward departure," 593 cases of "downward departure
w[ith] Boo/wi;" 12,032 cases of "below range w[ith] Bookei;" and 378 cases that "remain[ed] below
range" out of 68,270 total cases) [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2015 SO(
EBOOK]. These
figures combine all sentences imposed below the applicable range, whether they resulted from a
formal departure (on substantial assistance or other grounds) or from a post-Bookervariance.
42.

U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2002 SOI RCEBOOK, snp/an
note 41, at 59 tbl.s9.

43.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2015 SO[)IR(EBOOK, snupa note 41, at tbl.29 (reporting that
48% of all defendants sentenced with range in FY 2015 were sentenced to the guideline
minimum and an additional 23.2% were sentenced within the lower half of the range). The
notable drop from 2002' to o15 in percentage of defendants sentenced to the absolute bottom
of the range is probably accounted for by the large increase in defendants sentenced, without
government motion, below the range altogether. In 2002, only 9.9% of fraud defendants were
sentenced below-range without a government motion, while in 2015 the percentage jumped to
3o.i%. Coampfte U.S.SiN Il NCING CONINI'N, 2002 S(URCE1OOK,supra note 41, at 56 tbl.2 7 , wilh
U.S. SiN I'NCING COMM'N, 2015 S(URCE.1OOK, Supra note 41, at tbl.27A. A fair inference is that
many defendants who in 2002 might have been sentenced at the guideline minimum due to the
absence of a plausible ground for a downward "departure" are now being sentenced below-range
based on Booket authorized "variances."
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would lead one to expect that the average sentence imposed on all defendants
in an entire offense category would be lower than the average guideline
minimum for those defendants. And that is precisely what the statistics show
for every major crime type except economic crime since 2OOl, the year in which
the Commission began publishing such data. For all the other major federal
crime types-drugs, guns, and immigration-judges have, on average,

consistently imposed sentences lower than the average guideline minimum.44
To me, the most remarkable aspect of the data in Figure 2 is that, in 2002,
the year the Economic Crime Package began to take effect, judges were, on
average, imposing economic crime sentences higher than the guideline
minimum. In 2002, 27.7% of fraud cases were sentenced below the applicable
range45 and 54.8% of the remainder were sentenced at the guideline
minimum,46 meaning that roughly 66.7% of all fraud defendants were
sentenced at or below the guideline minimum.47 Nonetheless, the number of
above-guideline-minimum sentences and the magnitude of those sentences
combined to completely offset and slightly overmatch all the downward
departures so that the average sentence imposed was about one month higher

44. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FNAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT: FNS(AL YEAR 2010, at 34-37
figs.E-H (201,), wvv.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/data-and-statistics/fedeial-sentencing-statistics/
quarterly-sentencing-updates/USSC_ o201_QuarterReportFinal.pdf (showing that the average
length of sentence imposed compared to average guideline minimum for fireaims, immigration, and
drug offenses from 2005-2010); seeU.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, ERNAL QUARTERLY DATA REPORT:
fIS(AL YEAR 2015, at 34-37 figs.E-H (2016), http://wvw.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/reseaichand-publications/federal-sentencing-statistics/qumteily-sentencing-updates/USSC2015 Quarterly Report Final.pdf (showing that average length of sentence imposed compared to
average guideline minimum for firearms, immigration, and drug offenses from 2010 -2015).
45. U.S. SiNIlENCING COMM'N , 2002 S(JRCI()K, sn/nranote 41, at 56 tbl.2 7 (reporting a
substantial assistance departure" in 17.8% of fraud cases and an "other downward departure"
in 9.9% of fraud cases).
46. Id. at 59 tbl.2 9 .
47. This figure is something of an approximation because it combines figures from two
tables with different N values. But it is a fair estimate. The total number of fraud defendants for
which we have departure data is reflected in Table 27: 6,378. Id. at 56 tbl.2 7 . Of those, 17.8% or
1,135 got substantial assistance departures, and another 9.9% or 633 got other departures. Id.
To figure out what percentage of those who did not get downward departures, but were sentenced
in range or at the bottom of that range, one must turn to Table 29, which says that 54.8% of
fraud defendants are sentenced at the guideline minimum. Id. at 59 tbl.2 9 . The computational
problem is that in composing Table 29, the Commission had to exclude quite a few defendants
for whom they had insufficient data on in-range sentence position. Id.at 59 tbl.2 9 n. i. So the
total number of fraud defendants considered in Tables 27 and 29 is different. Accordingly, I took
the 54.8% figure from Table 29 and assumed that it reasonably approximated the percentage
across all fraud defendants, and then multiplied 54.8% times the total number of fraud
defendants reported in Table 27 to produce an estimate of 2487 defendants sentenced at the
bottom of the range. I then added the 2,487 defendants sentenced at the bottom of the range to
the 1,135 defendants with substantial assistance departures and the 633 defendants that got other
departures to arrive at a total of 4,255 defendants that were sentenced at or below the guideline
minimum.
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than the average guideline minimum. As a result, unlike sentences for drugs,
guns, and immigration offenses, the average sentence imposed by federal
judges for economic crimes was within the guideline range.
It is also noteworthy that in the period before and immediately after the
effective date of the Economic Crime Package, the rate of downward
departures in economic crime cases awarded by judges without a substantial
assistance motionP8 was strikingly lower than the average for other case types.
In 2oo, the rate of non-substantial-assistance downward departures for all
cases was 18.3%, while the rate for fraud was 1 i.o% and for larceny 7.3%1!
In 2002, the rate of non-substantial-assistance downward departures for all
cases was 16.8%, while the rate for fraud was 9.9% and for larceny 6.2%.50 By
comparison, in 2015, judges imposed below-range sentences without a
government motion in 3 o . 1% of fraud cases and 28.2% of larceny cases, at a
time when the average below-range rate for all cases was 21.3%. 51
Taken together, these facts suggest that from 2001 to 2002, the interval
just before the Economic Crime Package and the post-Sarbanes-Oxley
amendments began to bite, the Guidelines were prescribing economic crime
sentences with whichjudges were generally comfortable. This conclusion may
seem at odds with the undoubted fact that the push to increase sentences for
high-to-very-high-loss defendants that produced changes in the 2oo loss
table was championed by an important contingent of federal judges.,However, the statistics cited above are consistent with the conclusion that
judges were generally satisfied with guideline sentences in the mine run of
economic crime cases, but were troubled by the perceived inadequacy of
guideline sentences for some serious offenders.
The mere fact that for some period the average sentence imposed on
economic crime defendants was above the average guideline minimum
remains strikingly discordant with the pattern in other offense types. Anyone
who has practiced under the Guidelines recognizes that the essential
directionality of plea negotiations and sentencing arguments is down, by
which I mean that the default assumption in virtually all plea negotiations is
that the bottom of whatever range emerges from a negotiated plea will be

48.

A substantial assistance motion is a motion by the government pursuant to 18 U.S.C.

§ 3553(e) and/or U.S. SININING GUIIELNIS MANUAL § 5 Ki.i (U.S. SINITINCIN.

COMM'N

2016), requesting that the defendant receive a sentence below the applicable guideline
minimum or statutory minimum sentence based on his or her cooperation with the government
in the investigation or prosecution of another person.
49. U.S. SiN Il NCING COMM'N, 2001 SOURCEOO00K OFFI)ERAL SENIENCING S IAISI'ICS 56 tbl.2 7
(o002), http://www.ussc.gov/research/2015-sourcebook/archive/sourcebook-2oo
[hereinafter U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, 2001 SOuVRCEBOOK].
50.

U.S. SENilENCING COMM'N, 2002 SOURCLBOOK, supranote 41, at 56 tbl. 27

51.

U.S. SENilENCING COMM'N, 2015 SOURCEBOOK, supranote 41, at tbl.-2A.

52.

See supra note 38 and the accompanying text.

.
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sufficiently punitive to satisfy the government. Usually the only remaining
question is whether some further diminution of the sentence should be
awarded, either with or without the government's imprimatur.5'. In this
environment, the fact that, in economic crime cases before 2oo3, sentences
above the bottom of the range more than offset downward departures
suggests that this default assumption was not operating for a substantial
number of economic crime defendants. Put simply, the data suggest that prior
to about 2003 judges felt the guideline minimum was not severe enough in
an unusually large fraction of economic crime cases.
This does not necessarily mean that before the Economic Crime Package
the economic crime guidelines were set too low across the board. Rather, it
suggests that they were set at a level which encouraged judges to use the full
guideline range more often than was customary for other offense types, which
should be a considered a good thing. After all, a system that designates
guideline ranges presumably intends for those ranges to represent realistic
sentencing options in a large fraction of cases.
In addition, before 2003, judges were more disposed to depart upwards
in economic crime cases than in other types. This inference is supported by
statistics on upward departures in the years before and during the transition
to the new sentencing levels dictated by the 2oo Economic Crime Package
and the post-Sarbanes-Oxley amendments. Upward departures have always
been rare (another indicator of the downward directionality of plea
negotiations and sentencing practice in the Guidelines era), but as Figures 3 54
and 4"5 below indicate, from 2000 to 2004, upward departures in the core
economic crime categories of fraud and larceny were consistently more

53. Of course, this is not true in every case. Sometimes the parties will either agree that a
sentence above the guideline minimum is appropriate, or will agree that the government is free
to argue for an above-minimum sentence or even an upward departure above the range.
However, in my experience as both prosecutor and defense counsel, and based on review of data
and conversations with other practitioners, such cases are a distinct minority.
54. The data in Figure 3 is drawn from the U.S. Sentencing Commission's annually
published Sourcebook of1edera.Senteu iig Statistis for the years 2000-2004, and found in Table 27
in each respective Sotucebook. U.S. SENTEN(ING COMM'N, 2004 SOUtRCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENIENCING SIAIISICS tbl.2 7 (2005), http://ww.ussc.gov/research/2o15-sourcebook
/archive/sourcebook- 2004; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2003 SOUR(CEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS tbl.2 7 (004), http://www.ussc.gov/research/2015-sourcebook
/archive/sourcebook-2oo3; U.S. SiNIl NCING COMM'N, 2002 S0URCI
)OK, supra note 41, at 56
tbl.2 7 ; U.S. SENTEN(CIN(G COMM'N, 2001 SOUR(CEBOOK, snpra note 49, at 56 tbl.2 7 ; U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N, 2000 SOUR(CEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICs 56 tbl. 2 7 (2001),
http://,Aw.ussc.gov/research/2015-sourcebook/archive/sourcebook-2000.
In 2004, the
Commission reported data for the period before the Supreme Court'sJune 24, 24004 decision in
Blakely v. Washilnzton, 5424 U.S. 2496 (14004), separately from the period following that decision.
The 2004 data in Figure 3 is from the pre-Blakely period.
55.
The data in Figure 4 is drawn from the U.S. Sentencing Commission's annually

published Soumcebook olFederalSentenucingStatisticsfor the years 2000-1004, and found in Table 27
in each respective Sourcebook. See supta note 54. The 2004 data in Figure 4 is also from the preBlakely period.
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common than average.
Figure 3. Percentage of Upward Departures (Fiscal Years
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In sum, the data suggests that, in the period just before the 2OO
Economic Crime Package and 2oo3 post-Sarbanes-Oxley amendments began
to take effect, the economic crime guidelines were set at a severity leveijudges
found broadly acceptable, if perhaps a smidgeon on the low side in some
really serious cases. This conclusion, if correct, has important ramifications
for the ongoing debate about the severity level of sentences currently
prescribed under section 21B1.1. In a nutshell, if we assume that guidelines
ought to be calibrated at levels judges are generally comfortable with
imposing, it appears that this objective could be achieved for economic crime
by recalibrating sentences prescribed by the Guidelines to roughly
pre-Economic Crime Package levels. Note that this recalibration would not
require abandoning either the 2001 consolidation of the formerly separate
fraud and theft guidelines into current section 2B 1.1 or the 2001 redefinition
of "loss." All that would be necessary would be readjustment of the loss table
and reconsideration of some specific offense characteristics.>6
Of course, the assumption that Guidelines should hew closely to judicial
preferences or comfort levels is fairly debatable. In the economic crime realm
in particular, there is an often-stated and I think reasonable fear that, left to
their own devices, judges will accord undue leniency to white-collar thieves
from their own social class.57 For precisely this reason, the original 1987 fraud

56. I recognize, of course, that some readers may find this sort of incremental approach
insufficient. Given that more than 1o years have now elapsed since the Booker opinion rendered
the Sentencing Guidelines advisory, it is not unreasonable to think that the Sentencing
Commission should by now have wholly reconfigured the Guidelines to conform to the new
constitutional reality. As I and others have observed, the Guidelines are now a bizarre and
unwieldy anomaly-a highly complex, fact-driven set of rules designed to narrowly constrain
judicial discretion that judges still must adhere to procedurally, but can now effectively ignore

substantively. See generally Frank 0. Bowman, III, Nothing Is Not Enough:Fix the Absurd Post-Booker
kederal Sentecing System, 24 FED. SENT'G. REP. 356 (201 2 ). The Sentencing Commission surely
should redesign the entire Guidelines structure in light of Booker (and while doing so recalibrate
sentencing levels that are normatively suspect). But I am skeptical that such a redesign is either
within the institutional capabilities of the Commission or politically possible given today's toxic
congressional environment. Incremental improvements to the current structure seem more
possible.

57. Judge Bennett alludes to this concern, employing a revealing turn of phrase. He writes:
"The statistical evidence on sentencing discretion, then, raises the question of whether, after
three decades of sentencing reform,judges still empathize with economic criminals (as they were
reported to do in the i98os), or if the sentencing guidelines simply failed to approximate judges'
proper estimates ofthe harm done." Bennett et al., supra note i, at 964 (emphasis added) (footnote
omitted). Note the confident assumption that the capacity for arriving at "proper estimates of the
harm done" by economic crime rests with judges, rather than legislatures or other system actors.
I certainly concur that the actual sentencing decisions of judges, particularly if considered
collectively, are one important indicator of the appropriateness of sentencing levels, but I

disagree with the implication that judges should be the sole arbiters of this question. If that were
the case, the customary federal sentence for even very large frauds would still be probation, as it
was in the pre-Guidelines era. Before the Guidelines,judges were demonstrably and unreasonably
sympathetic to economic criminals who, not coincidentally, tended to be of the judges' own race

2017]

RECALIBRA TING THE ECONOMIC CRIME GUIDELINE

219

and theft guidelines were purposely set higher than prevailing norms to
counteract thejudicial preference for giving very low sentences to white-collar
criminals.a8 Nonetheless, it is not unreasonable to conclude that nearly 30
years under the Guidelines have entrenched a new, and more punitive, norm
that would not be entirely erased by a modest recalibration to roughly preNovember 2OO1 levels.
But even if we were to agree that reversion to roughly pre-Economic
Crime Package sentencing levels would, on average, be more in line with
judicial preferences, that would not tell us exactly what changes we ought to
make in the current guidelines. The data on average sentences is, at best, a
vey rough gauge of the views of judges about any one of the many different
types and classes of economic offender. For example, these averages standing
alone are consistent with at least two quite different views of pre-2oo
economic crime sentencing: (a) that the severity of sentences under the
pre-2001 regime was about right for all types and grades of offenders; or
(b) that, as was the common wisdom among the stakeholders in the Economic
Crime Package debate, high-loss sentences were sometimes too low and lowloss sentences were sometimes too high. The averages cannot tell us whether
to revert to pre-2oo sentencing levels for all offenders or to accept some of
the changes made during 2001-2003, while rejecting others.
III.
A.

How SHOULD SECTION 2B 1.1 BE RECALIBRATED?
THi- BIINNI"I SIL)YAND)RJ{CAIlBlINI3IAf(ISICfION 2Bi.I

Among the most interesting and thought-provoking features of the
article by Judge Bennett and his colleagues is its study of how 18o federal
district courtjudges, federal magistrate judges, and state judges responded to
a sentencing case study.59 The judges were presented with a hypothetical case
in which the defendant, a corporate insider, committed securities fraud
against his own company causing a loss of approximately $7 million."' The

and class. Marvin E. Frankel, Sentenucing Gidelines: A Need for Creative Collaboration, 101 YALE LJ.

2043, 2047 (1'992). Their collective judgment was wrong then. The Guidelines provided a muchneeded corrective. The question with which we wrestle now is whether, and if so to what extent,
the Guidelines over-corrected for the judges' previous under-estimation of the harmfulness and
blameworthiness of economic criminals.
58.
Justice Stephen Breyer who before his elevation to the Supreme Court served as one of
the original members of the U.S. Sentencing Commission said of white-collar offenders: "A preGuidelines sentence imposed on these criminals would likely take the form of straight
probationary sentences." Stephen Breyer, The l, eal Senlening (uide/nes and Ihe Key Compromises
t/pon Whiuh They Rest, 17 HOFSIRA L. REV. 1, 7 n.49 (1988). He reported that the Commission
concluded that the Guidelines' objectives would be better se ed by the imposition of "short but
certain terms of confinement for many white-collar offenders." Id. at 2o.
59.

Bennett et al., s*ura note 1, at 965

6o.

Id.

.
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judges were told that the defendant had entered a plea pursuant to Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 1 1 (c) (1) (C) obliging the court to sentence
within a range of 151 to 240 months (12 12 to 2o years) which roughly
corresponded to the sentencing guideline range for such an offenseil The
judges were asked to choose a sentence within this range, but not allowed to
sentence outside of it, and were also asked questions about their personal
2
characteristics and sentencing philosophy.
The results reported by Judge Bennett illuminate a number of issues
relating to judicial sentencing practice, particularly questions about how
political affiliation, age, gender, sentencing philosophy, and other personal
characteristics influence a judge's sentencing decisions.t3 However, I will
focus here only on the extent to which the study assists in deciding how to
recalibrate section 2B1.1. Despite its many virtues, the Bennett study is not
very useful in that regard. Indeed, I fear that, on this point at least, the study's
authors may be over-interpreting their data.
The study reports that 75.0% of federal district court judges, 55.0% of
federal magistrate judges, and 27.1% of state judges sentenced the
hypothetical defendant to the minimum available sentence of 151 months.64
The authors interpret these figures as demonstrating dissatisfaction by the
federal district judges with the 151-month minimum sentence, and by
extension with the severity of the guidelines that purportedly dictated this
minimum.% Although I agree that there is considerable dissatisfaction among
members of the federal district court bench with guideline sentences in many
high-loss cases, I cannot agree that this study does much to prove the existence
of such dissatisfaction. Nor do I think it helps very much in pinpointing the
set of cases judges find most troubling. Moreover, the response of state court
judges to the study's scenario significantly undercuts the notion that
sentences in the range of 12 to 15 years for serious economic crime are selfevidently unreasonable.
Consider first the federal districtjudges. To begin, we know that, in real
life, federaljudges have complete discretion to sentence below the applicable
guideline range. We also know that, in real life, when they sentence within
range, they overwhelmingly sentence at the bottom of the range."" But
because the study artificially precluded judges from sentencing below the
prescribed range, it impossible to say how many of the 75% who sentenced at
the bottom of the range thought that 151 months was too severe a
punishment for this defendant. For all we know, most or even all such district

61.
624.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.at 966.
Id.at 966-67.
Seeid. at 968-71.
Id. at 968.
Id.at972.
See supra notes 49-51 and accompanying text.
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judges thought that 151 months was entirely appropriate.
Moreover, the model presentence investigation report ("PSI") provided
to the study participants is strikingly devoid of the kinds of mitigating
circumstances and humanizing personal characteristics that are standard fare
in real white-collar cases of this type. I have no doubt that Judge Bennett and
his colleagues structured the PSI in this way to avoid the confounding effects
of such information. But the result is that the experienced federal district
judges in the study were presented with what would appear to them as an
atypical white-collar PSI, one from which they might well conclude that the
defendant merited a sentence at the bottom of the substantial prescribed
range, but no lower.
It is only by looking outside of the Bennett study and comparing the 75%
figure with what we know from the Commission's data on actual sentences
that we can conclude that at least some of the judges who awarded the
guideline minimum would very probably have sentenced below 151 months
if permitted by the parameters of the study. In 2014 over one-quarter of all
fraud cases were sentenced below range without a government motion;67 it is
thus fair to surmise that some of the studyjudges would have sentenced below
range if allowed. But we cannot know how manyjudges would have done so."'
One point on which the Bennett study is of no material assistance is
whether federal district judges consider their hypothetical guidelines
sentencing range for a $7 million securities fraud to be more or less
appropriate than the guideline sentences for other types and sizes of fraud.
Since the study participants were offered no hypothetical cases with different

67.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2014 SOUR(CEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS
tbl.2 7 A (2015),
http://www.ussc.gov/research/2015-sourcebook/archive/sourcebook-2014

(reporting that in FY 2014, 28.3% of fraud defendants were sentenced below the guideline
minimum without a government motion).
68. Even so, the meaning of the 75% low-end study result for federal district judges is
muddied by the fact that, at least in my opinion, the range of 151 to 235 months represented in
the study as being a fair approximation of the guideline range in a real case with these facts
substantially overstates the likely guideline range. See Bennett et al., supranote i, at 966, 985. In
particular, the guidelines calculation employed byJudge Bennett and his colleagues includes a
four-level increase for causing substantial financial hardship to five or more victims. Id. at
990-94 app.A. However, there are no facts in the pre-sentence investigation report provided to
the study participants that would support this enhancement. Id. at 995-1000 app.B. Absent those
four levels, the guideline range for this defendant would be 97 to 121 months (about 8 to io
years) .Judge Bennett calculates the hypothetical defendant's offense level as 34 and his Criminal
History Category as I, producing a guideline range of 151 to 88 months. Id. at 991-92. If one
subtracts the four offense levels for causing substantial financial hardship, the total offense level
becomes 30 and the guideline range becomes 97 to 121 months. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANLIAL § 5 A (U.S. SiNIl NCING COMM'N 2o16) (sentencing table). Any district courtjudgewho

consulted the guidelines would realize that the study calculation was markedly too high for this
defendant. Whether any judges performed this calculation and, if so, whether such a calculation
affected such judges' decision about how to sentence this case is unknown, but the implications
cannot be disregarded.
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loss amounts or other facts, one cannot tell whether the judges would have
been more or less disposed to impose low-end sentences in such cases.
In short, the most one can say of the Bennett study is that: (a) it is
consistent with the general pattern of federal district judges sentencing
disproportionately at the low end of the applicable guideline range in all case
types, including white-collar crime; and (b) it is not inconsistent with other
data showing that federal district judges sentence below the applicable
guideline range in many white-collar cases, particularly those with large loss
amounts.
The most interesting aspect of this section of the study is the markedly
different results reported for federal magistrate judges and statejudges. Fortyfive percent of magistrate judges and 73% of state judges sentenced the
hypothetical defendant above the prescribed 15 1-month minimum."-) Judge
Bennett reads the marked difference between the reactions of these judges
and the federal districtjudges who imposed an above-minimum sentence only
25% of the time as signaling a high level of "resistance to a recommended
sentence" among federal district judges, perhaps arising from "experience
with (or rejection of) overly harsh sentencing guidelines."7o This is not an
implausible hypothesis. But, as noted above, the limitation of the Bennett
study to a single scenario and its prohibition of downward departures from
the stipulated sentencing range diminishes the study's usefulness in
determining how many participating federal district judges disapproved of
the stipulated range on normative grounds.
Far more intriguing is the fact that the majority of federal magistrate
judges7 and the overwhelming majority of state judges seemed perfectly
comfortable with the stipulated range of 151 to 240 months. Indeed, the
mean sentence imposed by state judges was 174.81 months or 14 12 years,
almost two years above the stipulated minimum.72 The limited scope of the
Bennett study prevents drawing any definitive conclusions about this
difference in perspectives. But two hypotheses suggest themselves.
First, large fraud cases are much more common in federal than state
court and federal districtjudges are more likely than state courtjudges to have
sentenced a number of such cases or talked with colleagues who have done
so. 3 Consequently, as intimated by Judge Bennett, they are likely to be

69. Bennett et al., supra note i, at 968.
70. Id.
at 972.
71. Forty-five percent of federal magistrate judges sentenced above the minimum of the
stipulated sentencing range. Id. at 968. It is reasonable to assume that at least some significant
fraction of those who sentenced at the minimum were not dissatisfied with that minimum as a
normative matter. Hence, it is reasonable to conclude that a majority of the federal magistrate
judges in the studywere normatively satisfied with the stipulated range.
72.
Id.
73. See id.
at 964.
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familiar with the foibles of the guidelines that generate lengthy guideline
ranges for such defendants,74 and they will have encountered defendants in
such cases as real persons rather than hypothetical constructs. By contrast,
federal magistrate judges do not sentence anyone. And state judges, though
they sentence people regularly, rarely encounter a multi-million-dollar fraud
case. A $7 million fraud of the sort employed in the study is a pretty big deal,
even in federal court. For example, in FY 2012, only 291 of 8501 federal
economic-crime defendants, or 3.4%, were sentenced for frauds with losses
exceeding $7 million.7 Although I am unaware of any definitive data on the
point,7 my experience as a both a state and federal prosecutor suggests that
the number of such cases in state courts is vanishingly small. It is not
unreasonable to suppose that state judges were willing to impose long
sentences in a $7 million fraud because the defendant had committed a crime
far more severe by any ordinary reckoning than any non-violent case they see.
Second, although I advance this second hypothesis far more tentatively,
it may be worth observing that federal district judges are better paid than
magistrate judges and virtually all state trial courtjudges,77 enjoy higher social
status, and not uncommonly come to the bench from well-compensated
private practice or federal government practice backgrounds.7 To the extent
that there may be a class bias in favor of white-collar defendants, federal
districtjudges are at least arguably more likely to share the class characteristics
of white-collar defendants than magistrate judges or state judges.
Finally, the comfort expressed by state courtjudges with sentences in the
12 to 15 year range for a large, but not extraordinary, fraud suggests that

74. See id.
75. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, ECONOMIC CRIME PUBLIC DATA BRIEFING I I fig.6 (2 015),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/fies/pdf/amendment-process/public-heaings-and-meetings/
2015010 /fraud briefing.pdf.

76. A survey by the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners found that the median loss in
frauds against privately held businesses in 2o14 ranged between $'6o,ooo and $231,ooo between
2010-2014. ASS'N OF CERTIFIED FRAU D EXAM'RS, REPORT TO THE NATIONS ON OCCI PATIONAL FRA D

ANI AIBLS: 201 4 GBA. FRAUD SLUDY 2 4 (2014), http://wAW.acfe.com/rttn/docs/2ol4-report-to-

nations.pdf. The survey states that 6o.9% of these frauds were referred for criminal prosecution in
2014, but due to the global nature of the survey, it does not divide those that were referred between
federal and state referrals. Id. at 64.
77. In 2o15, the salary of a federal district judge was $2o1, oo. Juidiial Compensation, U.S.
CoURTS, http://ww.uscourts.gov/judges-judgeships/judicial-compensation (last visited Mar. 19,
2017). A federal magistrate judge may receive no more than 92% of the salay of a federal district
judge. History of the Federal Judiciary, FL). JUD. CTR., http://wv.fjc.gov/histonr/home.nsf
/page/js 6.html (last visited Mar. 19, 2017). By contrast, in 2015, the median salary of generaljurisdiction state-trial judges was $146,8o3. KNOW I 1(E & INFO. SERVS. OFFICE, NA I. CiR. FOR Si AllE
COURIs, SURVIY OJ IL)ICIAL SAIARI LS 1 (2016), http://wv.ncsc.org/FlashMicrosites/
JudicialSalaryReview/ 2 )1 5/resom-ces/ CurentJudicialSalaies.pdf.
78.
See generally Russell Wheeler, ChantgingBackgroundso[1US. District Judges: Likely Causes antd
PossibitImplications,93 Ju IICA LURE 140 (20 10) (describing the pre-appointment backgrounds of
federal district judges).
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sentences of this magnitude are not self-evidently unreasonable for such a
case. After all, a group of experienced, and perfectly reasonable, judicial
officers approved of them. The difference between federal district court and
state trial courtjudges may be proof, not that statejudges are unduly punitive,
but that federal judges can become unduly blas6 about serious economic
crime.
As noted, Ijoin Judge Bennett and his colleagues in the broad consensus
that the Guidelines as now configured dictate unreasonable sentences for
certain economic offenders, particularly in cases where a large loss combines
with other aggravating specific offense characteristics. But the Bennett study
does not help very much in identifying a level or zone in which the current
Guidelines begin to generate unreasonably punitive sentences. My personal
sense is that the range of truly problematic sentences for serious white-collar
offenses begins right around the low end of the range in the Bennett study.
Or to put it another way, my sense is that, except in an extraordinary case,
judges will strongly resist sentencing a non-recidivist white-collar offender to
any term higher than the 10 to 15 year range. The Bennett study is at least
consistent with this notion, and further evidence for such resistance can be
found in Sentencing Commission data that correlates loss amount with
sentences imposed.
Figure 5 below, reproduced from the Bennett article and employing data
published by the Sentencing Commission staff,79 shows that the average

sentence imposed in FY 2012 in large-loss cases (those exceeding $2.5
million) ranged from just under five years to just under 12 years (the sole
exception being a pair of cases in the $ioo to $2oo million range where the
average sentence was 210 months or 17.5 years). Of course, the average
sentence imposed in such cases is pulled down by many substantial assistance
departures and other government-sponsored accommodations. Moreover,
many defendants were sentenced above the reported averages and some well
above it, but it is plain that the norm in such cases is a sentence far below the
much higher levels prescribed by the Guidelines, and sentences above lu to
15 years are an anomaly even in the largest fraud cases.

79.

Bennett et al., supra note 1, at 963 fig.3A.

8o.
Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, the average guideline minimum sentences
reflected in Figure 5 are quite probably the product of plea bargaining arrangements that
produced far lower guideline ranges than honest application of the Guidelines' rules would
generate. See Bowman, suptra note 7, at 2 74-75.
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Figure 5. Average Sentence Length and Average Guideline Minimum
for Each Section 2Bi.i Loss Table Category (2oi )
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LOOK TO 2001 FORA RESETPOINTFOR SECTION 2BI. i

If the Bennett study offers little help in determining how to recalibrate
section 2Bl.1, where else might one look? In testimony to the Sentencing

Commission, I have suggested that section 2Bl.1 should be recalibrated by
"set[ting] a ceiling on the punishment government can justifiably mete out
for the most serious financial crimes, and then ...scal[ing] the punishments
for lesser forms down from that maximum." ' , Although I continue to think
this would be the theoretically optimum approach, cold-bloodedly specifying
a maximum sentence for the most serious financial crimes would be both
conceptually and politically difficult.
The conceptual problem is twofold. First, one must identify the
combination of factors that make up the most serious type(s) of financial
crime. Second, using some rationally justifiable criteria, one must assign a
maximum punishment to that grade of crime. You might say that the
Guidelines have already performed the first task of identifying the most
serious crime types by placing loss amount at the center of section 2B 1.1 and
then adding aggravating specific offense characteristics. By this logic,
whatever class of offenses generates the highest offense level under section

81.

BOWMAN, supranote

12,

at 14 ; seeBowman, supanote 7, at 277-78.
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2B 1.1 is the most serious financial crime. The problem is that the offenses
and offenders who score highest under the Guidelines do so not because of
any considered comparison of their crimes to other types, but simply because
of the higgledy-piggledy accretion of specific offense characteristics over the
past three decades. It might well be that the defendants who now receive the
highest offense level scores under the Guidelines are indeed the class of
defendants we as a society think are most deserving of punishment, but no
one has ever actually made that determination. I would be pleased if the
Sentencing Commission undertook a serious normative evaluation of this
problem, but it would be a tough task.
If the Commission performed that task, it would still face the second
conceptual problem: assigning a number-a particular term of years-as the
most severe punishment that ought to be imposed for a financial crime
(absent the most extraordinary circumstances, which wouldjustify an upward
departure or variance). This may be an even tougher task that identifying the
most serious financial offense type. After all, correlating the commission of a
specific crime with a specific increment ofjudicially prescribed pain is more
an exercise in metaphysics than logic. In practice, judges and sentencing
commissions rarely, if ever, confront that philosophical conundrum, but look
instead to markers like past sentencing patterns. Accordingly, if the
Commission could identify the most serious types of economic crime, it could
analyze sentencing data from federal and state courts to determine a rough
consensus about the maximum sentence for such offenses that would provide
the top anchor from which the remainder of the guidelines would be scaled
downward. To describe this process is to reveal its inherent uncertainty.
Even if conceptual obstacles could be overcome, a completely rational
redesign of section 2B1.1 starting with a designated maximum guideline
sentence for the worst economic crimes would face political obstacles, as well.
As presently configured, section 2B1.1 prescribes sentences of 30 years or
even life imprisonment plus multiple additional offense levels in a fair
number of fraud cases each year. Except for once-in-a-blue-moon instances
like Bernie Madoff, who received 150 years,S3 judges will not impose such
sentences. Nonetheless, any effort to scale back guideline fraud sentences by
baldly declaring that the maximum guideline sentence for all economic crime
cases will henceforth be, say, 2o or 25 years, is likely to be vigorously opposed

82.
See, .g., United States v. Adelson, 441 F. Supp. 2d 5o6, 511 (S.D.N.Y. 2oo6) (scoring
defendant at offense level 46); United States v. Parris, 573 F. Supp. 2d 744, 747-48 (E.D.N.Y.
2008) (scoring defendant at offense level 42, with a guideline range of 30 years to life
imprisonment); see also Bowman, sunpra note 5, at 168 (describing the effect of current guideline
rules on sentences prescribed for corporate fraud); Bowman, note 7, at 273-75 (describing how
parties to high-loss fraud cases appear to be reducing defendant guideline ranges through factor
bargaining).
83.
Diana B. Heniques, Mad/ffls S(reened Io 150 Years fot lonzi Shene, N.Y. TIMIES (June
29,
2009),
http://wv.nytimes.com/2o9/o6/.30/business/3omadofflhtml.
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as "soft on crime" by some in Congress and some elements of the Justice
Department ("DOJ"). Opponents will inevitably point to Madoff and a few
other high-profile bad actors as evidence that the selected guideline
maximum is not enough punishment for these heinous poster children, while
ignoring the reality that the advisory guidelines system leavesjudges at perfect
liberty to sentence far above that maximum in truly extraordinary cases. Thus,
rather than identifying a single specific maximum guideline sentence on
which opponents can fixate, it may be easier to achieve scaled-back fraud
sentences by arguing for reversion to a previous systemic norm for which there
was demonstrable judicial support.
Which is where the data concerning the 2001 inflection point comes in.
We know that, at least on average, sentences for economic crimes in 2001
were broadly acceptable tojudges.8 4If our present aim is to recalibrate section
2B 1.1 in a way that judges find useful and satisfactory, it makes sense to use
pre-2001 sentencing levels as a reference point. This does not, of course,
mean that the Commission should simply void every amendment to the
economic crime guidelines from November 2001 forward. It merely suggests
that 2001 sentencing levels provide a helpful frame of reference to be
considered together with other data.
IV.

SPECIFIC REMEDIES

The remainder of this Article will discuss the remedies prescribed by
Judge Bennett and colleagues for the ailing economic crime guideline.

A.

TH- Loss TABLE311

Critics of section 2Bl.1 often complain that "loss," the reasonably
foreseeable pecuniary harm caused or intended by the defendant,5 has too
large an effect on guideline sentences. Although the current definition of
"loss" has its detractors,s" the core criticism of section 2Bl.1 is that loss,
however defined, adds too many offense levels to defendants' guideline
calculations and thus increases sentence length by unduly large amounts. As
I noted recently:
[T] he loss table of the November 2015 version of Section 2B1.1 has
fifteen two-level steps pursuant to which loss amount can add from
two to thirty offense levels. A first-time offender convicted of mail or
wire fraud now begins with a base offense level of 7, meaning that,
loss and other specific offense characteristics aside, his or her

84.

See supra notes 47-524 and the accompanying text.

85.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2Bl.1
COMM'N 2016).

cmt. n. 3 (A)(i) (U.S. SENTENCING

86. For an extended discussion of the loss definition and common criticisms of it, see
generally Bowman, supta note 27.
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starting sentencing range is o-6 months. Accordingly, to say that loss
can add two to thirty offense levels means that loss amount alone can
now raise such a defendant's offense level to 37, and the guideline
range all the way to 2 1o-262 months (17.5-21.8 years).t7
As will be discussed in the next section, the impact of so large an upward
adjustment for loss alone is compounded when multiple section 2B1.1
specific offense characteristics and Chapter 3 role and victim adjustments are
added.
Judge Bennett recommends that the section 2B 1.1 loss table be given a
"buzz-cut."88 I concur in the sentiment, but, as I am sure judge Bennett would
agree, the "buzz-cut" imagery with its suggestion of simply whacking a bunch
of offense levels off the top understates the degree of tonsorial artistry that
will be required to reconfigure the loss table properly. Reconfiguration of the
table requires addressing two problems: first, what is the maximum influence
even the largest loss amount should have on an economic crime sentence? Or
putting it more concretely, what is the maximum number of offense levels
that any defendant should be assigned for loss, however large? Second, should
the Commission simply eliminate some number of levels at the top of the loss
table, leaving everything below that level the same? Or should it also
recalibrate the amounts of loss associated with each remaining two-offenselevel increment?
To illustrate the interaction of these two problems, I reproduce below
the 2015 version of the section 2B1.1 loss table.89 Suppose, one wanted to
reduce the maximum number of offense levels chargeable to a defendant
based on "loss" from the 30 levels possible today to the 20 levels available
under the 2ooo guidelines. The simplest way to achieve that end would be to
eliminate the top five increments of the loss table (as I have indicated by
striking through them in Figure 6). Although this might be a beneficial step
in itself, it would leave a table that: (a) made no distinction between a $9.5
million fraud and a $55o million fraud; and (b) provided no reduction or
modification of current guideline sentences for any defendant with a loss less
than $9.5 million. On the former point, some may be of the view thatjudges
should simply employ their post-Booker discretion to differentiate between very
big and stupendously large frauds. That may be so, but the difference between
stealing $9.5 million and stealing half-a-billion dollars is so large that perhaps
the Guidelines should formally recognize some intermediate interval(s) in
that range. On the latter point, given that the primary complaint about the

87.

88.
89.

Id.at 5 (footnotes omitted).
Bennett et al, supra note i, at 983.
Figure 6 reproduces the values in the 2015 loss table, see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES

MANUAL § 2Bi.1 (b)(1) (U.S.SENIINCING COMM'N 2015) (sentencing table). The modifications

are recommended by the author, see ina text accompanying notes 92-94.
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current guideline is its tendency to over-punish high-loss offenders, one
would think that any redesign of the loss table should give some attention to
cases below the $9 million range. In any case,Judge Bennett intimates, - and
I agree, that the Commission would need to give careful thought both to the
aggregate number of offense levels available for loss amount and to resetting
the loss amount triggers for each two-offense-level bump.
Figure 6. The Values of the 2015 Loss Table

o

9 .

Loss Amount

Offense Lew Is

$650o or less

No increase

More than $6500

Add 2

More than $15,ooo

Add 4

More than $40,000

Add 6

More than $95,000

Add 8

More than $150,000

Add 1o

More than $250,000

Add 12

More than $550,000

Add 14

More than $1,5oo,ooo

Add 16

More than $3,500,000

Add 18

More than $9,500,000

Add 20

Bennett et al, supra note i, at 985-86.
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I will add only a few more thoughts about how the loss table ought to be
restructured. First, asJudge Bennett notes, I advised the Commission in 2015
to eliminate the top four steps on the existing offense table.'-, This would
make the maximum amount on the loss table $25 million and the maximum
enhancement for loss 22 levels. Judge Bennett views this suggestion as
inadequate, primarily because the loss enhancement of 22 offense levels for
the largest cases would remain too high, and perhaps also because he views
the class of cases requiring sentencing relief as beginning with losses lower
than $25 million.!2 I do not entirely disagree on either point. However, my
proposal to the Commission was made with political realities in mind and it
seemed to me that a four-level haircut was the absolute maximum the
Commission might consider. Even that assessment proved over-optimistic
since the Commission cut no levels from the table. If permitted to leave
political calculations to one side, I would recommend that the maximum
number of steps on the loss table be reduced by five (bringing the total
number of steps on the table from 16 to 1 1). This would reduce the maximum
number of offense levels attributable to loss from 30 to 2o. The result would
be a return to the number of loss table steps and loss-based offense levels in
effect prior to the 2000 pre-Economic Crime Package level.93
Of course, a fair argument could be made that the 2001 and 2003
revisions of the loss table were responsive to judicial and DOJ concern over
unduly low sentences for serious fraud offenders and to fairly clear
congressional directives to increase sentences for high-loss defendants.4 If
the Commission is unwilling to roll back the loss table all the way to 2000
levels, it should nonetheless consider eliminating only the top four steps on
the table, making the maximum loss adjustment 22 offense levels. That would
represent real progress toward rationalizing high-end sentencing without
openly repudiating congressional directives and stakeholder views.
Second, if some number of loss table steps were removed, I do not have
much detailed advice about how to recalibrate the surviving 20 or 22 steps.
Assuming the primary discontent with the current table is large-loss cases, the
first question will be what constitutes a "large" loss and thus at what loss table
step and corresponding loss amount the Commission should begin its
revisions. I have created in Figure 7 below a Model Loss Table by way of
illustration. It consists of only 11 steps and modifies the top four remaining
loss steps by increasing the loss amount that correlates with each two-offenselevel increase. The numbers I have inserted are largely notional.'5 An actual

91.

Bowman, supranote 7, at 278-79; see also Bennett et al., supra note i, at 983.

92.

Bennett et al., sp@ra note 1, at 983.

93.

U.S. SIENilENCINC;G1

94.

Bowman, supra note 2, at 411-15.

95.

I did pick the maximum loss amount in the Model Table, $50 million, with reference

D1 ANiESMANIA

§ 2B1.1(b)(1).
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recalibration should be based on careful study of the distribution of cases, loss
amounts, and sentences in the overall high-loss category.
Figure 7. Model Loss Table
Los Amounti1

Ofn

$65oo or less

No increase

More than $65oo

Add

More than $15,ooo

Add 4

More than $40,000

Add 6

More than $95,000

Add 8

More than $15o,ooo

Add 1o

More than $250,000

Add

B.

Lexels

2

12

SPEFC6 OPTENSf CIL41A46 ftL
I ISr1CS ("SOCs ")

Judge Bennett and friends also recommend a "buzz-cut" to the large
number of specific offense characteristics ("SOCs") in section 2B1.1.9 I have
argued for some years that, particularly in high-loss cases, the interaction of
the current loss table with multiple SOCs, some of which are highly correlated

to the fact that in IY 2012 there were at least 56 cases with a loss of more than $50 million. U.S.
SENTENCING COMM'N,sIprna note 75, 9 fig'4. By contrast, in 2012, there were only 12 cases in the
top two steps of the then-existing loss table. Id.
Even the top end of the loss table should apply to
some appreciable and recurring number of cases. If not, the handful of cases falling into the top
level(s) should be dealt with through upward variances. In addition, in this Model Table, $50
million loss amount associated with a 2)0 offense-level increase is lower than the $8o million
required for a 2Olevel increase in 200o. This would allow areversion to the pre-Economic Crime
Package maximum of '20offense levels for loss, while expanding the applicability of that 20-level
maximum. This would be another way of reforming the table, while acknowledging
Sarbanes-Oxley era congressional directives to increase sentences for high-loss offenders.
96. Bennett et al., supra note i, at 985.
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with large losses, can produce insupportably high sentences.97 And I agree
with Judge Bennett that some of the SOCs in section 2B 1.1 are of relatively
8
little value in distinguishing relative offense severity.)
That said, I thinkJudge Bennett somewhat mischaracterizes the problem
with section 2B1.1 SOCs. He begins by quoting the observation of Professor
Kate Stith andJudgeJose Cabranes that "the Commission has never explained
the rationale underlying any of its identified specific offense characteristics,
why it has elected to identify certain characteristics and not others, or the
weights it has chosen to assign to each identified characteristic."", He implies
that the Stith-Cabranes statement applies to section 2B1.1 SOCs. This is, at
best, only half-right.
The rationalesfor virtually all of the Guidelines' economic crime SOCs
have been extensively explored by the Commission, its staff, and system
stakeholders and observers, and the Commission's rationales have customarily
been formally articulated in published "Reasons for Amendment. 100 It is true
that the Commission's amendment process was formerly more opaque, but it
has improved the transparency of its decisional process over the years and, at
least since the period leading up to the 2001 Economic Crime Package, all
the Commission's decisions about economic crime sentencing, including the
SOCs of section 2B1.1, have been the subject of robust and open debate
capped by Commission decisions with explanations.'"0 One can disagree with
the Commission's choices on economic crime over the past 15 years, but one
cannot fairly claim that the Commission has failed to explain them.

97.
98.

See Bowman, supra note 5 at 168-69; Bowman, supranote 7, at 271-73.
SeeBennett et al., supranote i, at 985-86.
99. Id at 986 (quoting KATE STITH & JOSt A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING: SENTENCING
Gi IDELINES IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 69(1998)).
iot. Space does not permit an exhaustive demonstration of this point in this Article, but the
extensive discussion of the Commission's 2015 amendments to section 2B 1.1 before, during, and
after its March I2, 2015, public hearing on those amendments illustrates the basic process. InJanuary
2015, the Commission published proposed amendments to section 2B i. i, including alterations of
several of its SOCs. Proposed Amendments to Sentencing Guidelines, So Fed. Reg. 2570, 2586-9 o
(proposed Jan. 16, 2015). Each proposed amendment was accompanied by an explanation of the
problem the amendment was seeking to address and by questions on which the Commission sought
input. Id. Thereafter, the Commission received extensive commentary on the proposed amendments
and held a public hearing. See Public liearingoni Proposed Awendmwets to the Iedeal Sentenicing (uidelines,
U.S. SENT'GCOMMISSION (March 12, 2o 15), http://www.ussc.gov/education/videos/public-hearingmarch- 12-2015. The Commission then made some changes to its original proposals and promulgated
final amendments in April 2015, which were accompanied by the Commission's explanations of its
decisions. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, AMENDMENTS TO THE SENTENCING GUIDELINES 24-34 (2015),

http://,vA.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/amendment-process/reader-friendly-amendments/
20150430 RF Amendments.pdf.
101.

See Bowman, supra note 3, at 81 -82

(discussing the 2001 elimination of the former

more-than-minimal planning SOC and the addition of the sophisticated means and multiple
victim SOCs).
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Moreover, the rationales for virtually all the section 2B1.1 SOCs are selfevident. For example, section 2B1.1 (b) (2) (A) prescribes a two-level increase
for committing an offense involving ten or more victims, employing mass
marketing, or causing substantial financial hardship to one or more victims.
Stealing from multiple victims is, all else being equal, worse than stealing from
one person. Employing mass marketing risks causing harm to larger numbers
of persons than less sophisticated techniques. And stealing so much from a
single person that it endangers that person's solvency is worse than stealing
an amount that is merely inconvenient.
Judge Bennett also states that most economic crime SOCs have "no
empirical basis." 102 This has become a fairly common trope in post-Booker
critiques of particular guideline provisions, but I have never known quite what
to make of it. Any guidelines system is the result of a melding of three
processes: (1) an effort to rank the relative seriousness of different kinds and
degrees of criminal behavior; (2) an effort to assess the social dangerousness
and personal culpability of individual defendants; and (3) an effort to
correlate offense seriousness rankings and personal culpability assessments
with ranges of punishment.
Empiricism may be of some assistance in the latter two processes. For
example, if a guidelines system enhances punishment based on a defendant's
criminal history on the theory that prior conduct is predictive of recidivism
and thus of enhanced social dangerousness, that theory can be empirically
tested. Similarly, if one purpose of punishment is to reduce crime through
deterrence or promoting rehabilitation, empirical studies might be able to
assist the process of setting the range and type of punishment most likely to
reduce recidivism for particular classes of offender. But even the processes of
assigning significance to prior criminal history and setting punishment levels
are heavily driven by non-quantifiable considerations. For example, if it were
proven empirically that repeat offenders present no increased recidivism risk,
we might conclude that repeat offenders are more morally culpable than firsttime offenders and deserve greater punishment on that ground. Punishments
for many crimes are driven by considerations of moral desert, rather than
crime prevention. We sentence murderers to long terms or execute them,
even though as a class they have a lower recidivism risk than most other
offenders. 103
In any case, the process of ranking offense seriousness-which is what
Chapter Two of the Guidelines and all the many SOCs therein are abouthas little to do with empirically falsifiable determinations. Offense seriousness

1 o.

1o3.
IN

3

Bennett et al., supra note I, at 986.
SenBIRIAU OFJUSHCE SIAHSI ICS,U.S.DEP'I'0FJ1 USticl, RCII)IVISM (FPRISONIRS REILEASI)

o SIAlI sIN 2005: PAI'RNS FROM 2005 10 2010, at 8 tbl.8 (2014), http://AVw.bjs.gov/content/

pub/pdf/rprtso5P05
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ranking is driven primarily by moral judgment and social policy. The
determination that premeditated murder is a more serious offense than a
negligent homicide is not empirically testable. Nor is the determination that
criminal homicide of any type is usually, but not always, a more serious offense
than robbery.1'4 Both are essentially moraljudgments. The same is true of the
conclusion that stealing from multiple victims is worse than stealing from one,
or that stealing so much from one person that his financial security is
endangered is worse than stealing the same amount from another person who
could more easily afford the loss. Relatedly, when the Guidelines rank stealing
a lot of money from a federal health care program as a more serious offense
than stealing from other entities,"5 that ranking represents a social policy
judgment that fraud against such programs is a major problem that the
federal criminal law should be employed to prevent. The scope of health
insurance fraud may be empirically measurable, but the decision to rank
health care fraud as a more serious, and more severely punishable, class of
fraud does not rest on any empirically testable proposition. o,
The problem with the section 2B1.1 SOCs is not that, taken individually,
they are irrational or lack empirical support. The problem, and here I concur
entirely with Judge Bennett, lies in the second half of the Stith-Cabranes
complaint, namely that the Commission has failed to give adequate
consideration to the weight accorded these SOCs, and in particular to their
interaction with each other and with the loss table. As I wrote when
commenting on the Commission's 2015 amendments:
The cumulative effect of the evolution of the economic crime
guidelines from 1987 to 2000, the 2001 Economic Crime Package,
and the 2003 Sarbanes-Oxley-driven amendments has been: (1) to
give loss amount ever-increasing weight, while (2) progressively
teasing out a long list of factors that are highly correlated with bigdollar frauds-and for which, therefore, the large enhancements in
the Loss Table are already a proxy-and giving those factors

104. For example, criminally negligent homicide is commonly a less serious offense than the
most serious grades of robbery. Compare Mo. REV. STAT. § 565.07 (2o 16) (stating that criminal
negligent involuntary manslaughter is a Class E felony punishable by up to four years of
imprisonment), with MO. Ri V.S'iAl. § 570.023 (2017) (stating that first degree robbe r y is a Class
A felony punishable by i o-3o years of imprisonment or life imprisonment). The Missouri statute
specifying sentence lengths for different classes of crime is Mo. RI v. S l'a1'.§ 558.o 1 (2016).
105.

U.S.

SENiENCING GUIE)LINIS MANUAL

§ 2B1.1(b)(

7

)

(U.S. SENIl NCING

COMM'N

2016).

jo6. I suppose one could argue that the deterrent effect of an additional increment of
guideline severity could be tested. The difficulty is that, even assuming that deterrent effect could

be accurately measured, deterrence is not the only legitimate purpose of punishment. Even if no
additional deterrent effect could be found, one could rationallyjustify an increase in punishment
for health care fraud on the ground that stealing from programs designed to help the sick is
particularly morally despicable.
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Accordingly, the current challenge is figuring out how to reduce the
cumulative effect of economic crime SOCs, particularly in high-loss cases.
Judge Bennett recommends a comprehensive review of section 2B 1.1 SOCs
conducted with a "presumption that most should be removed unless there is
solid empirical data to support [them] .,lS As noted, I doubt that empiricism
has much to say about SOCs.&°9 But I agree that a thorough review of section
2B1.1 SOCs would be desirable and that a good many could be either
removed altogether or transformed into factors judges are encouraged to
consider when setting sentences within range or for purposes of departure or
variance.
That said, there are likely to be several practical impediments to this
project. First, given the extreme modesty of the Commission's 2015
amendments, which were adopted as the long-awaited culmination of a multiyear study of fraud sentencing in which all the critiques Judge Bennett and I
share were thoroughly aired, one is disposed to doubt that the Commission
has the appetite for so detailed an undertaking. Perhaps, as several
commissioners have intimated, they may revisit fraud sentencing as part of a
general overhaul of the entire Guidelines structure,,- but for the near term,
I am not holding my breath.
Second, as Judge Bennett acknowledges,- a good many of the section
2B 1.1 SOCs were enacted by the Commission in response to congressional
directives, and the Commission has customarily declined to undo
amendments of this sort."12 One might argue that the Commission's
unwillingness to revisit such SOCs is unduly timid. Except in the rarest of
instances, the so-called "congressional directives" did not legally require the
Commission to enact any particular guideline change. Rather, they
customarily took the form of language requiring the Commission to review

107.

Bowman, supra note 7, at

io8.

Bennett et al., supra note i, at 986.

272-73

(footnote omitted).

109.
This is not to say that the question of which SOCs to keep, which to discard, and which
to modify should be answered without careful thought informed by certain kinds of data. For
example, the Commission should carefully consider data on questions like the degree to which a
given SOC correlates with the presence of some other SOC such that imposing enhancements
for both risks double punishment. However, we should foreswear the illusion that data is going
to yield answers to questions that primarily concern values and priorities.

110.
U.S. SENIINCING COMM'N,su/,rta note 12, at 194-95, 207 (comments of Commissioner
Rachel Barkow and Commissioner William H. Pi'or,.Jr.).
Ill.
Bennett et al., supra note i, at 986 n.214 1.
1 1 2.

See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, sura note i2, at 19 o-91

(comments of Commissioner

Patti B. Saris expressing concern about effect of congressional directives on possible guidelines

amendments).
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the existing Guidelines and "ensure" the adequacy of sentences for crimes of
a specified type.,,, There is no denying the strength of the hint embodied in
such language, but the Commission could have concluded that the thencurrent sentences were perfectly adequate and declined to take the hint.
Likewise, there is nothing in the so-called directives that bars the Commission
from revisiting their earlier choices and concluding that some or all of the
congressionally-stimulated
increases
have
proven
excessive
or
counterproductive and should now be revisited. However, there is little
indication that the Commission is any more disposed to boldness now than it
has ever been.
It was in recognition of the Commission's practice of treating any SOC
enacted in response to Congress as effectively inviolable that in 2015 I
recommended placing a numerical cap on the cumulative effect of SOCs, rather
than trying to winnow them out of the Guidelines individually.,4 Absent a
wholesale rewrite of the section 2B1.1, this still seems the most promising
approach to the problem of sentence inflation by SOC.

C. THt VICIi TABLI
Judge Bennett maintains that both the current multiple-victim
enhancement of section 2B..1(b)(2) and its pre-2015 predecessor are
deficient and unduly inflate sentences in certain classes of fraud cases.'5 I
agree. I have discussed my concerns elsewhere and will not repeat them
here.:
I also agree with Judge Bennett that the ABA's proposal to rank
"victim impact" seems highly subjective and unlikely to prove useful., 7 1 will
only add that I am not convinced thatJudge Bennett's alternate proposal, to
substitute assessments of victims' "emotional distress,"" 8 would adequately
address the problem. Not only does assessment of emotional state seem highly
subjective, but I am not sure that it is desirable to impose different
punishments on defendants based on differing emotional responses by
victims to otherwise identical defendant behavior. Moreover, I am not sure
that the Bennett alternative accounts for two of the primary issues the current
guideline is designed (however imperfectly) to address-the fact that stealing
from multiple victims is, ceteris paribus, worse than stealing from one victim,
and the fact that the same quantum of monetary loss can have differential
economic impacts on different persons.

113.
See generally Bowman, supranote 2, at 405- 1 (discussing the congressional directives to
the Sentencing Commission in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 20024).
114.

Bowman, supra note 7, at

115.

Bennett et al., supra note 1, at 9

ii6.

Bowman, su/nanote 7, at 276-77.

117.

Bennett et al., supra note 1, at 986-87.

'18.

Id. at 982, 987.

279-8o.

86

-87.
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In the end, I tend to think that the Guidelines should eliminate both
victim number and assessments of special financial impact as SOCs triggering
specific offense level enhancements. Both factors would be better addressed
as considerations in setting a sentence within or outside of the guideline
range. At a minimum, the size of the existing victim enhancements under
section 2B1.1(b) (2) should be markedly decreased. It is now possible to
receive a six-level increase for causing substantial financial hardship to 25 or
more victims."9 Because of the logarithmic character of the Guidelines'
sentencing table, this six-level bump roughly doubles a defendant's guideline
sentence. Given that causing this much harm to 25 people would necessarily
involve a very significant pecuniary loss, with a correspondingly large offenselevel increase from the loss table, doubling the resultant guideline range for
victim hardship seems gratuitously punitive.
D.
Judge Bennett urges
enhancement.'' I agree.' 2'

E.

SOIPHIS7iCA lid MiANS

elimination

of

the

sophisticated

means

DEPARTURE FOR LACK OFPECUNIARY GAIN

Judge Bennett recommends addition of an encouraged downward
departure in cases where "the offender's gain is substantially lower than the
loss the offender caused."122 The notion that a defendant's punishment
should be lower when his personal gain is less than the victim's loss has been
around for a long time. A departure on this ground was considered and
rejected as part of the 2ooi Economic Crime Package,1 2B but variations of the
idea continue to surface.124 I cannot endorse the suggestion.
As I have explained in detail elsewhere, offense seriousness rankings are
based on three factors: the magnitude of the harm caused by the crime, the
magnitude of the harm risked by the crime (sometimes even when the harm
did not occur), and the defendant's culpable mental state.' 25, "Loss," when

119.

U.S. SENTENCING GiUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B.1(b)(2)(C) (U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N

2016).

12o.

Bennett et al., supra note i, at 988.

121.

Bowman, su/ra note 7, at 28o.

12 ).

Bennett et al., supra note i, at 988.

123.

See Bowman, supro note 3, at 74-75.

See, e.g., Eric A. Tirschell, Vice-Chair, Practitioners Advisory Grp., Testimony Before the
United States Sentencing Commission i (March 12, 2015), http://w w.ussc.gov/sites/default/
124.

files/ pdf/amendnent-process/ public-hearings-and-meetings/ 2o150312 /Tirschwell.pdf

(urging the

Sentencing Commission to devalue loss as a measure of offense seriousness and to increase the
importance of factovs such as "the extent to which the offender personally profited or intended to gain
from the crime").
125.
Bowman, supra note 247, at 8- 11.
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actual, is a direct measurement of harm and a decent, if imperfect, proxy for
mental state.126 Loss, when unrealized but intended, is a direct measurement
of culpable mental state and a decent, if imperfect, proxy for harm risked.127
By contrast, the personal gain of any single defendant is not a reliable direct
measurement of harm, risk of harm, or mental state.
Gain equates to harm only insofar as the defendant's gain derives from
the victim's loss. But there are many cases in which the gain of the defendant
being sentenced is only a fraction of the loss to the victim and it is difficult to
see why this fact should affect sentencing. To take the simplest case, if three
crooks swindle me out of $1 million and then split the take equally, the gain
to each defendant will be only one-third of my loss. Why should these three
crooks receive a lower sentence than if only one of them had inflicted the
same amount of harm? Or suppose in the same case that one of the three
crooks, after swindling me, gives his confederates only $io,ooo apiece and
sticks to the rest himself. Why should the two who were foolish enough to
believe in honor among thieves receive a lower sentence? Given that the three
joined together to harm me, why should the later perfidy of one coconspirator have any effect on the sentence of the others?
Numerous other examples could be offered. The imperfect correlation
between harm and gain is indicated by the fact that the guidelines allow gain
as a measurement of loss (the primary measurement of harm in economic
crime) only where loss itself cannot be reliably determined.2S
The disposition to compare gain and loss may stem from an imperfectly
articulated intuition that gain relates to culpable mental state. The idea may
be that securing all or most of the victim's loss for oneself signifies greed,
which may be thought to be a more blameworthy mental state than mere
intention or willingness to cause a loss in the first place. I confess that I cannot
follow this logic. Greed in the sense of a desire for material wealth is a constant
of the human condition. It only becomes criminal when it is coupled with a
choice to break the law and harm others to secure wealth. Consider a
securities fraud case in which corporate insiders lie about the financial status
of their company in order to inflate the value of their own stock options, or
just to fool the board of directors into retaining them in their positions and
continuing their salaries. The loss to investors in such cases can run to tens or
hundreds of millions of dollars, but the "gain" to the defendants may be only
tens or hundreds of thousands. Or suppose that I commit insurance fraud by
hiring you to set a fire to my house. If I pay you $1o,ooo for the arson and
126.
Id. at 1 -13. Because actual loss is defined by section 4B1 . n. 3 (A) (i) as "foreseeable
pecuniaiy harm," it also contains elements of risk analysis. Compau'U.S. SENi INCINC GU I1)1 INLS
MANUAL § 2Bi.i cnt. n.3 (A) (i), withBowman, supra note 27, at 13.
127.

Bowman, supranote 27, at 18- 19.

128.
U.S. SENTENCINGGiUIDELINESMANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n. 3 (B) (U.S. SENTENCINGCOMM'N
2016) ("The court shall use gain that resulted from the offense as an alternative measure of loss
onh if there is a loss but it reasonably cannot be determined.").
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later collect $500,000 from the insurance company, should you be considered
less responsible for the destruction your arson caused because you got a
smaller payout? As a general matter, why should a defendant's willingness to
impose large harms on another in order to achieve only modest gains for
himself count as a mitigating factor?
Perhaps the best explanations for the persistent interest in comparisons
of gain and loss are these: first, in some multi-defendant cases, a particular
defendant's small gain relative to overall victim loss may signify that the smallgain defendant played a relatively minor role as compared to other
defendants who got more money. Second, sometimes the relatively small size
of the defendant's gain in comparison to the victim's loss may indicate that
the defendant set out to commit a crime of modest financial benefit to
himself, but ended up causing large, but foreseeable, financial harms to
others. In some such cases, Guidelines critics think the definition of actual
loss as "reasonably foreseeable pecuniary harm that resulted from the
offense"- over-inflates loss and over-punishes defendants. I understand both
concerns, but a downward departure provision triggered merely by a
disproportion between gain and loss is too crude a tool to alleviate these
specific concerns. If they are to be addressed in the Guidelines themselves,
language particularly directed at each should be inserted.
V.

CONCLUSION

I close by reiterating my admiration for the work of Judge Bennett and
Professors Levinson and Hioki. Their article is a significant addition to the
literature on federal economic crime sentencing. We agree on all the major
points. I hope their work is read and carefully considered by the Sentencing
Commission and other stakeholders in the ongoing conversation about how
economic crime sentencing can be improved. I offer the foregoing comments
only to sharpen that conversation regarding some potentially important
details and I hope they will prove of some use to that end.

129.

U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MAN[ AL § 2B1.1 cmt. n. 3 (A) (i).

